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NOTE
Citizen Activist or Professional Lobbyist?
Eighth Circuit Decides That Political
Activity is “Lobbying” Only When Money is
Involved
Calzone v. Summers, 942 F.3d 415 (8th Cir. 2019).
Maddie McMillian Green*

I. INTRODUCTION
In determining the constitutionality of lobbyist registration laws, where
do courts draw the line between lobbyists and politically active citizens?1
What is the difference between a citizen simply sharing their ideas with their
elected officials and influencing them? In 2019, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit attempted to draw the line in Calzone v.
Summers by holding that Missouri lobbyist registration laws violated the First
Amendment as applied to an uncompensated lobbyist who incurred no
expenditures relating to his lobbying efforts.2 This decision protects
individuals who neither spend nor receive any money in connection with their
political activities from the requirement that they register as lobbyists in the
State of Missouri. After hearing the decision of the Eighth Circuit, the
plaintiff, Ronald Calzone, stated in an interview:
It has been a long time coming, but I’m pleased that the Court of
Appeals got this right. Unpaid citizen activists like myself keep our
elected officials informed and accountable by sharing our views about
public policy. A government cannot force unpaid activists to jump
*

B.A., University of Missouri, 2016; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of
Law, 2021; Senior Note and Comment Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2020-2021. I
am grateful to Professor Christina Wells for her comments and guidance during the
writing of this Note and to Calla Mears and Jackson Gilkey of the Missouri Law
Review for their thoughtful edits. Finally, thank you to my dear friend, Lucinda
Luetkemeyer, for bringing this case to my attention but, more importantly, always
encouraging me in my study of the law.
1. HARVARD LAW REVIEW, Case Comment, Recent Case: Calzone v. Summers,
HARV. L. REV. BLOG (Dec. 5, 2019), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/recent-case_calzone-v-summers_/ [https://perma.cc/2BSB-4BFT].
2. Id.
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through regulatory hoops in order to exercise their First Amendment
rights.3

His lawyer affirmed, “Our system of government depends on people like
[Calzone] actively sharing their policy ideas with those in power, but for years
powerful legislators have been trying to silence him.”4 However, while they
may not receive monetary compensation for their efforts, “unpaid lobbyists
could still offer things of value to legislators.”5 Some argue that the decision
gives lobbyists permission to “influence lawmakers in secret so long as they
don’t spend or receive any money in the process.”6
Part II of this Note outlines the facts and holding of Calzone v. Summers.
Part III explains Missouri’s lobbyist requirements and how the First
Amendment comes into play in this case. Part IV examines the reasoning the
Eighth Circuit used in reaching is decision in Calzone v. Summers. Finally,
Part V argues that the dissenting opinion more accurately portrays the state of
lobbying and lawmaking in Missouri.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Ronald Calzone lives in central Missouri, where he raises cattle and
horses and owns a small manufacturing business.7 He is also an “active
figure” in Missouri politics.8 He speaks to members of the Missouri General
Assembly “regularly” both in private, one-on-one meetings with them and
when testifying before them in public committee hearings.9 While he speaks
to legislators only when pressing his own views with them, Calzone often acts
through a nonprofit organization called Missouri First, Inc. (“Missouri
First”).10 Calzone is the “incorporator, sole officer, president, director, and
registered agent” of Missouri First, which both parties agree is his “alter

3. INSTITUTE FOR FREE SPEECH, Volunteers Are Not Lobbyists, Rules Eighth
Circuit: Ron Calzone, Institute for Free Speech, Freedom Center of Missouri, Notch
Big Win in Missouri (Nov. 1, 2019), https://www.ifs.org/news/volunteers-are-notlobbyists-rules-eighth-circuit/ [https://perma.cc/5PD8-2C5C].
4. Id.
5. Calzone v. Summers, 909 F.3d 940, 948 (8th Cir. 2018), vacated en
banc, 942 F.3d 415 (8th Cir. 2019).
6. Mark Joseph Stern, The Trump Bench: David Stras, SLATE, (Nov. 5, 2019),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/11/trump-bench-david-stras-8thcircuit.html [https://perma.cc/2X58-R9TT].
7. Ron Calzone, Lobbyists, legislators aim to quash political activist’s free
speech,
ST.
LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH,
(Sept.
30,
2015),
https://www.stltoday.com/opinion/columnists/lobbyists-legislators-aim-to-quashpolitical-activist-s-free-speech/article_5053629c-ec48-57c8-b5e8e5e3b39a4bba.html [https://perma.cc/BUK2-JMYR].
8. Calzone v. Summers, 942 F.3d 415, 418 (8th Cir. 2019).
9. Id.
10. Id.
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ego.”11 According to its charter, Missouri First seeks to “evaluat[e] and
produc[e] public policy ideas with an emphasis on individual liberty, free
market capitalism, constitutionally limited government, and other principles
that are consistent with the concept of an American constitutional republic.”12
The organization supports specific legislative and ballot initiatives as well as
specific candidates who promote its objectives, but it will not campaign for a
particular political party.13 It recruits like-minded citizens to help advance its
legislative agenda by either joining the organization,14 volunteering, or
providing financial support.15 However, neither Calzone nor Missouri First
spends or receives any money in pursuit of that mission.16
Merriam-Webster defines a “lobbyist” as “one who conducts activities
aimed at influencing or swaying public officials and especially members of
a legislative body on legislation.”17 Missouri law defines “lobbyist” as any
natural person defined either as an executive lobbyist, judicial lobbyist,
elected government official lobbyist, or a legislative lobbyist.18 According to
the State of Missouri, because of his connection to Missouri First, Calzone is
a “legislative lobbyist.”19 As relevant here, a legislative lobbyist is any person
who attempts to influence state legislative actions and has been “designated
to act as a lobbyist by any […] nonprofit corporation, association[,] or other
entity.”20 Calzone admits that he lobbies the Missouri General Assembly so
11. Id.
12. MO.
FIRST
CHARTER,
http://www.mofirst.org/docs/charter.htm
[https://perma.cc/CZ3V-4Y2B] (last visited December 11, 2020).
13. Id.
14. To join Missouri First, an individual must simply agree with the principles
outlined in the organization’s charter and then complete a form on the Missouri First
website with the individual’s name, address, and email address. JOIN MO. FIRST,
http://www.mofirst.org/join.php [https://perma.cc/3GV6-3UZ2] (last visited
December 11, 2020). The website reads: “Why join? By joining Missouri First, you
place your name and influence on the right side of issues affecting Missourians. The
old saying, ‘there is strength in numbers’ holds true, especially when individual
citizens are active in lobbying Missouri House and Senate members, but with a
consistent message. You may be certain that Missouri First is working hard to
represent your values in the issues that touch your life as, together, we equip The
People to instruct their elected officials.” Id.
15. ABOUT
MO.
FIRST,
http://www.mofirst.org/about.htm
[https://perma.cc/HKS7-5N4R] (last visited December 11, 2020).
16. Calzone v. Summers, 942 F.3d 415, 418 (8th Cir. 2019).
17. Lobbyist,
WEBSTER’S
DICTIONARY,
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/lobbyist [https://perma.cc/23W9-T7TZ] (last visited
December 11, 2020). The etymology of “lobbying” supposedly traces back to the
hallways – or lobbies - of the Parliament of the United Kingdom where members of
Parliament and their peers would meet with their constituents before and after debates.
See http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/82529.stm [https://perma.cc/T4BEB55P].
18. MO. REV. STAT. § 105.470 (2020).
19. Summers, 942 F.3d at 419.
20. § 105.470 (emphasis added).
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he is a lobbyist in the most general sense of the word – meaning he seeks to
influence public officials – but he contends he is not a “legislative lobbyist”
as defined by Missouri statute.21
In accordance with state law, all lobbyists – executive lobbyists, judicial
lobbyists, elected government official lobbyists, and, most notably, legislative
lobbyists – must complete a list of legal requirements. All lobbyists must file
a registration form with the Missouri Ethics Commission (“MEC”) within five
days of beginning lobbying activities.22 The form costs ten dollars to file and
must include the lobbyist’s name and business address, the name and address
of anyone employed by the lobbyist for lobbying purposes, and the name and
address of each principal by whom the lobbyist is employed or in whose
interest the lobbyist appears or works.23 Once filed, the information becomes
a matter of public record.24 Lobbyists must update the MEC within one week
of a change in their employment or representation.25 They are required to file
monthly expenditure reports, including any money spent on behalf of “public
officials, their staffs and employees, and their spouses and dependent
children.”26 They must also file a monthly statement detailing “any direct
business relationship or association or partnership” they have with any public
official.27 Twice a year, each lobbyist must provide a description of any piece

[A] ‘legislative lobbyist’ is any person who attempts to influence state
legislative actions and meets the requirements of any one or more of the
following: (a) Is acting in the ordinary course of employment, which primary
purpose is to influence legislation on a regular basis, on behalf of or for the
benefit of such person’s employer, except that this shall not apply to any
person who engages in lobbying on an occasional basis only and not as a
regular pattern of conduct; or (b) Is engaged for pay or for any valuable
consideration for the purpose of performing such activity; or (c) Is designated
to act as a lobbyist by any person, business entity, governmental entity,
religious organization, nonprofit corporation, association or other entity; or (d)
Makes total expenditures of fifty dollars or more during the twelve-month
period beginning January first and ending December thirty-first for the benefit
of one or more public officials or one or more employees of the legislative
branch of state government in connection with such activity.

Id. (emphasis added); see also Lobbying, MO. ETHICS COMM’N,
https://mec.mo.gov/MEC/Lobbying/Home.aspx [https://perma.cc/96U8-XLXJ] (last
visited Dec. 16, 2020).
21. Calzone v. Hagan, No. 2:16-CV-04278-NKL, 2017 WL 2772129, at *3
(W.D. Mo. June 26, 2017), vacated and remanded sub nom. Calzone v. Summers, 942
F.3d 415 (8th Cir. 2019).
22. Summers, 942 F.3d at 419; § 105.473. The online form can be found here:
https://mec.mo.gov/LFS/Registration [https://perma.cc/7CQJ-96EC].
23. Summers, 942 F.3d at 419; § 105.473.
24. Summers, 942 F.3d at 419.
25. Id.; § 105.473.
26. Summers, 942 F.3d at 419; § 105.473.
27. Summers, 942 F.3d at 419; § 105.473 (For example, if a lobbyist’s financial
advisor is an elected official, or if a lobbyist shares a business partnership with an
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of legislation they or their principal supported or opposed.28 All of these
reports become public record too.29 Anyone who does not comply with the
requirements could face fines or prison time.30
Anyone can initiate an investigation by filing a complaint with the MEC
alleging a violation of lobbyist requirements.31 In 2014 and 2016, two official
complaints were filed with the MEC against Calzone,32 asserting that he
violated Section 105.473 of the Missouri Revised Statutes because he was
designated as a lobbyist for Missouri First but failed to register as a lobbyist,
pay a lobbying fee, or make regular reports to the state as required by the
statute.33 In 2016, the MEC ordered Ronald Calzone to pay a one thousand
dollar fine and prohibited him from talking policy with state officials until he
registered as a “legislative lobbyist.”34
Calzone was convinced the lobbyist requirements violated his First
Amendment rights to free speech and to petition the government.35 With
assistance from the Institute for Free Speech and the Freedom Center of
Missouri,36 he filed suit in federal court.37 Calzone first sought a temporary
restraining order to prevent members of the MEC from enforcing the law
against him.38 However, the district court denied Calzone’s request, finding
that he was not likely to succeed on the merits.39 Next, Calzone moved for a
permanent injunction, challenging the constitutionality of the Missouri
statutes both facially and as applied to him.40 Ultimately, the district court
denied a permanent injunction and entered final judgment against Calzone.41
elected official, or if a lobbyist has a roommate who is an elected official, etc., the
lobbyist must disclose that information in his monthly statement to the MEC.).
28. Summers, 942 F.3d at 419; § 105.473.
29. Summers, 942 F.3d at 419.
30. Id.; MO. REV. STAT. §§ 105.473, 105.478, 558.002.1, 558.011.1(5), (7).
31. Summers, 942 F.3d at 419; MO. REV. STAT. §§ 105.473, 106.966.
32. The Missouri Society of Governmental Consultants filed the first complaint;
Michael Reid, a lobbyist for the Missouri Society of Governmental Consultants, filed
the second complaint. Calzone v. Summers, 909 F.3d 940, 944 (8th Cir. 2018),
vacated en banc, 942 F.3d 415 (8th Cir. 2019).
33. Calzone v. Hagan, No. 2:16-CV-04278-NKL, 2017 WL 2772129, at *1
(W.D. Mo. June 26, 2017), vacated and remanded sub nom. Calzone v. Summers, 942
F.3d 415 (8th Cir. 2019).
34. INSTITUTE FOR FREE SPEECH, supra note 3.
35. Summers, 942 F.3d at 419.
36. INSTITUTE FOR FREE SPEECH, https://www.ifs.org [https://perma.cc/H69A4C47] (last visited Dec. 16, 2020); FREEDOM CTR. OF MO.,
http://www.mofreedom.org [https://perma.cc/9XUR-L4V8] (last visited Dec. 16,
2020).
37. Calzone v. Summers, 909 F.3d 940, 944 (8th Cir. 2018), vacated en banc,
942 F.3d 415 (8th Cir. 2019).
38. Summers, 942 F.3d at 419.
39. Summers, 909 F.3d at 945.
40. Id.
41. Summers, 942 F.3d at 419.
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The court found that Calzone’s facial challenge failed because an ordinary
person could reasonably understand what the statute required, so it was not
unconstitutionally vague.42 Since Calzone had the authority to act on behalf
of Missouri First as its agent, he had the authority to appoint himself as a
lobbyist for Missouri First, meaning he was “designated to act as a lobbyist.”43
The court, using exacting scrutiny,44 found that Calzone’s as-applied
challenge failed because Missouri had a sufficiently important interest in
governmental transparency and requiring unpaid lobbyists to register with the
government and file lobbying reports was substantially related to furthering
that interest.45
The Eighth Circuit panel affirmed two-to-one.46 On appeal, Calzone
made three separate claims: (1) the district court applied the wrong level of
scrutiny to his constitutional claims; (2) Section 105.473 of the Missouri
Revised Statutes – the statute that describes lobbyist duties – is
unconstitutional as applied to him; and (3) Section 105.470 of the Missouri
Revised Statutes – the statute that defines a “legislative lobbyist” – is facially
unconstitutional for vagueness.47
First, Calzone argued that the district court erred in applying exacting
scrutiny to his constitutional claims instead of strict scrutiny.48 Like the
district court, the Eighth Circuit panel relied on Citizens United v. FEC in
rejecting this claim.49 In Citizens United v. FEC, the United States Supreme
Court held that “The Government may regulate corporate political speech
through disclaimer and disclosure requirements, but it may not suppress that
speech altogether.”50 Citing Citizens United, the Eighth Circuit held in
Minnesota Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson that laws that burden
political speech are subject to strict scrutiny, unless the law is a disclosure
law, in which case it is subject to exacting scrutiny.51 Based on that precedent
and the fact that the statute at issue here is a disclosure law,52 the court found
that exacting scrutiny is the correct standard of review for Calzone’s First
42. Summers, 909 F.3d at 945.
43. Id.
44. “Exacting scrutiny” – sometimes referred to as “intermediate scrutiny” –
requires that a disclosure requirement is substantially related to a “sufficiently
important governmental interest.” Id. at 945–46 (emphasis added).
45. Id. at 948-49.
46. Id. at 951.
47. Id. at 945.
48. Id. “Strict scrutiny” – a higher standard of review – requires that a disclosure
requirement is necessary to achieve a compelling government interest and is also
narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. See Calzone v. Summers, 942 F.3d 415, 423
n.6 (8th Cir. 2019).
49. Summers, 909 F.3d at 945.
50. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 319 (2010).
51. Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, 692 F.3d 864, 874–75
(8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 366 (2010)).
52. Since Missouri’s lobbying law requires Calzone to reveal his identity and his
activities, it is a “disclosure law.” Summers, 942 F.3d at 423.
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Amendment claim.53 Second, Calzone claimed that Section 105.473 of the
Missouri Revised Statutes is unconstitutional as applied to him – an
uncompensated lobbyist – considering he “does not accept money for his
activism, nor does he spend money on legislators or legislative staff when he
communicates with them about his public policy beliefs.”54 He argued that
Missouri only had a sufficient interest in having paid lobbyists register so, as
applied to him, the statute is unconstitutional because he is unpaid.55 But the
Missouri statute does not differentiate between paid and unpaid lobbyists, so
the government’s interests are “not limited solely to paid lobbyists”56 The
court wrote:
We agree that transparency is a sufficiently important governmental
interest to satisfy exacting scrutiny. Though the lobbyists may not be
receiving money, unpaid lobbyists could still offer things of value to
legislators, creating a sufficiently important governmental interest in
avoiding the fact or appearance of public corruption. Furthermore, the
government and the public have a sufficiently important interest in
knowing who is pressuring and attempting to influence legislators, and
the ability to pressure and influence legislators is not limited solely to
paid lobbyists.57

Therefore, Missouri has a sufficiently important government interest in
having unpaid lobbyists register too.58
Calzone argued that it was burdensome to register as a lobbyist and file
fourteen reports with the state each year, twelve of which must be filed under
penalty of perjury, simply to share his ideas on public policy with members
of the legislature.59 However, the court countered that the registration
requirements are so minimal that they impose only a “very slight burden” on
individuals who are required to register and report, so “the burden of these
requirements does not outweigh Missouri’s interest in transparency.”60 In
fact, the court stated, “Calzone would have an even easier time producing the
lobbying reports than most because the reports simply require Calzone to
make statements regarding expenditures related to his lobbying activities,
which he claims he does not engage in.”61
Further, the panel rejected Calzone’s as-applied challenge on procedural
grounds. The court concluded that since Calzone did not raise the issue of

53. Summers, 909 at 945–46 (quoting Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 318; Swanson,
692 F.3d at 874–75).
54. Summers, 942 F.3d at 419; Summers, 909 at 946-48.
55. Summers, 909 at 948.
56. HARVARD LAW REVIEW, supra note 1.
57. Summers, 909 F.3d at 948.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 947, 955.
60. Id. at 949.
61. Id.
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“unpaid lobbyists who make no expenditures related to lobbying efforts” until
oral argument, he forfeited the claim in district court and waived the argument
on appeal.62
Third, Calzone argued that Section 105.470 of the Missouri Revised
Statutes is facially unconstitutional because the word “designated” in the
definition of “legislative lobbyist” is vague.63 Like the district court, the
Eighth Circuit found that “designated” is clearly defined and the statute uses
the word within its plain meaning, so “‘people of ordinary intelligence’ would
have a ‘reasonable opportunity to understand’ what ‘designated’ means in the
context of the statute.”64
Judge Stras, the lone dissenter, argued that “Missouri’s lobbyingdisclosure law crosses the constitutional line by burdening Calzone’s core
First Amendment activities without either adequate justification or narrow
enough tailoring.”65 Then, in a rare move, the Eighth Circuit reheard the case
en banc and vacated and remanded.66 Judge Stras, then writing for the six-tofive majority and echoing his earlier dissent, held that Missouri cannot require
an individual to register as a “legislative lobbyist” if they do not spend or
receive money while lobbying.67

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
This Part begins by outlining the history of lobbyist requirements in the
United States and then moves to a discussion of the First Amendment.

62. Id. (emphasis added). Forfeiture is the loss of a right, privilege, or property
because of a crime, breach of obligation, or neglect of duty. Forfeiture, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
63. Summers, 909 F.3d at 949.
64. Id. at 950.
65. Id. at 951 (Stras, J., dissenting).
66. See Calzone v. Summers, 942 F.3d 415 (8th Cir. 2019). An “en banc” or “in
banc” proceeding in a United States Court of Appeals is one in which all judges “in
regular active service” participate, as opposed to a typical three-judge panel. 37 A.L.R.
FED. 274 (1978). For a case to be heard or reheard en banc, a majority of the judges
must order it. FED. R. APP. P. 35(a). The Supreme Court noted in United States v.
American-Foreign Steamship Corp. that en banc courts “are convened only when
extraordinary circumstances exist.” 363 U.S. 685 (1960). Rule 35(a) of the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure echoes that sentiment in stating that en banc hearings
are “not favored and ordinarily will not be ordered” except when “consideration by
the full court is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of its decisions” or the case
“involves a question of exceptional importance.” FED. R. APP. P. 35(a); see also James
J. Wheaton, Playing with Numbers: Determining the Majority of Judges Required to
Grant En Banc Sittings in the United States Courts of Appeals, 70 VA. L. REV. 1505,
1509 (1984).
67. Summers, 942 F.3d at 418; Summers, 909 F.3d at 951 (Stras, J., dissenting);
see also HARVARD LAW REVIEW, supra note 1.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol86/iss1/8

8

McMillian Green: Citizen Activist or Professional Lobbyist? Eighth Circuit Decides

2021]

UNCOMPENSATED LOBBYISTS NEED NOT REGISTER

305

A. Lobbyist Requirements
The role of lobbyists is controversial in American politics. Lobbyists
are hired and paid by businesses, nonprofits, and special-interest groups to
create policy and influence elected officials at all levels of government.68
Former President John F. Kennedy once described lobbyists as “expert
technicians capable of examining complex and difficult subjects in clear,
understandable fashion.”69 But not everyone describes lobbyists so
thoughtfully. In fact, lobbyists have long been painted in a negative light
because of their seeming influence over policymakers.70 Term limits
especially tend to shift power and influence from elected officials to
unelected, professional lobbyists.71 In most cases, lobbyists were there before
the elected officials took office, and they will be there when the elected
officials leave. Legislators do not always have time to become subject-matter
experts and by the time they are fully acquainted with an issue, their term
expires and the process starts all over again.72 Consequently, lobbyists and
legislative staff sometimes become “the repository for institutional
knowledge” so legislators depend on them and their advice when making
policy decisions.73 Lobbyists also have a unique perspective into the
68. Tom Murse, What Does a Lobbyist Do? THOUGHTCO. (Jan. 15, 2020),
https://www.thoughtco.com/what-does-a-lobbyist-do-3367609
[https://perma.cc/94FY-ZTXZ].
69. Id. Daniel T. Ostas, The Law and Ethics of K Street: Lobbying, the First
Amendment, and the Duty to Create Just Laws, 73 BUS. ETHICS Q. 31, 34 (2007).
70. See Maggie Blackhawk, Lobbying and the Petition Clause, 68 STAN. L. REV.
1131, 1157 n. 178 (2016); Zac Morgan, Court Rebuffs Attempt To Make Politically
Engaged Missourian Register As A Lobbyist, THE FEDERALIST (Jan. 28, 2020),
https://thefederalist.com/2020/01/28/court-rebuffs-attempt-to-make-politicallyengaged-missourian-register-as-a-lobbyist/ [https://perma.cc/8CNL-ZBS4]. In the
first year that Gallup included lobbyists on its “honesty and ethics list,” lobbyists
debuted at the very bottom, immediately below automobile salesmen. Jeffrey M.
Jones, Lobbyists Debut at Bottom of Honesty and Ethics List, GALLUP (Dec. 10,
2007), http://www.gallup.com/poll/103123/lobbyists-debut-bottom-honesty-ethicslist.aspx [https://perma.cc/VR5D-5B7V]. In a different poll, 71% of respondents
claimed that lobbyists held too much power. Lydia Saad, Americans Decry Power of
Lobbyists, Corporations, Banks, Feds, GALLUP (Apr. 11, 2011),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/147026/americans-decry-power-lobbyists-corporationsbanks-feds.aspx [https://perma.cc/RCH2-32Y8]. A 2006 poll, around the time of the
Abramoff scandal, had 77% of respondents agreeing that lobbyists bribing members
of Congress is just “[t]he way things work in Congress.” CBS NEWS & N.Y. TIMES,
Congress, the Abramoff Scandals, and the Alito Nomination (2006),
http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/CBSNews_polls/JANB-CON.PDF
[https://perma.cc/M2DC-H7P7].
71. Jason Hancock, In Their Own Words: Missouri Leaders on the Good and Bad
of
Term
Limits,
KANSAS
CITY
STAR
(Sept.
24,
2018),
https://www.kansascity.com/news/politics-government/article218682135.html.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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community and can alert legislators to issues that are important to their
constituents. However, some believe that lobbyists can use their position to
their advantage.
Much of the controversy about lobbyists centers around their ability to
use money, like a campaign donation, a gift, or simply a free lunch, to
influence policymakers. To combat such issues, virtually every state requires
lobbyists and entities that hire lobbyists to submit periodic disclosure
reports.74 Generally, the reports require lobbyists to disclose how much
money they spent on lobbying, what legislative issues they supported, and
which legislators they lobbied.75 The government can force lobbyists to
disclose their names and activities.76 And states can disclose the names of
individuals who help shape the law – even when no money changes hands –
in order to promote government transparency and accountability.77
The last time the Supreme Court of the United States reviewed a lobbyist
registration case was in 1954. In United States v. Harriss, the lobbyistdefendants were indicted for seeking to influence Congress without
registering with Congress and filing the necessary expenditure reports, as
required by the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act of 1946.78 The lobbyists
challenged the Act for being unconstitutionally vague.79 The Federal
Regulation of Lobbying Act of 1946 was the United States’ first
comprehensive federal lobbying law.80 The purpose of the Act was to provide
information to members of Congress about those who lobby them.81 It
required any person who spent or received money for the “principal purpose”
of influencing legislation to register with the Clerk of the House and the
Secretary of the Senate and file quarterly financial reports.82 However, the
Act was poorly drafted and narrowly interpreted.83 The Act was further
weakened by Harriss, when the Supreme Court upheld the Act’s

74. NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, 50 State Chart: Lobbyist Activity Report
Requirements (May 15, 2018), https://www.ncsl.org/research/ethics/50-state-chartlobbyist-report-requirements.aspx [https://perma.cc/3XZP-4QD4].
75. Id.
76. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625–26 (1954).
77. See Doe v. Reed, 586 F.3d 671 (2010) (holding that states can allow
referendum petition signatures to be publicly disclosed).
78. Harriss, 347 U.S. at 615–17.
79. Id. at 617.
80. Note, The Federal Lobbying Act of 1946, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 98, 103 (1947).
81. THOMAS M. SUSMAN, POLITICAL ACTIVITY, LOBBYING LAWS & GIFT RULES
GUIDE § 4:4 (3d ed. 2020). In an article on transparency, Justice Brandeis stated
“[s]unlight is said to be the best of disinfectants ….” Id. (quoting Louis D.
Brandeis, Other People’s Money and How the Bankers Use It
(1914),
http://louisville.edu/law/library/special-collections/the-louis-d.-brandeiscollection/other-peoples-money-chapter-v [https://perma.cc/3CZA-DHAG].
82. The Federal Lobbying Act of 1946, supra note 80; Susman, supra note 81 at
§ 4:4.
83. Ostas, super note 69, at 36.
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constitutionality, but narrowed its scope and application.84 The Court held in
Harriss that the Act only applied to paid lobbyists who “direct[ly]
communicat[e] with members of Congress on pending or proposed federal
legislation.”85 Further, the Court determined that the Act covered efforts to
influence the passage or defeat of specific legislation, but not other
Congressional activities such as communications with staff, and time spent by
lobbyists in researching, drafting, coordinating, and preparing for direct
communications.86 The Act was later repealed and replaced by the Lobbying
Disclosure Act of 1995, which also requires lobbyists who are compensated
for their efforts to register with the Clerk of the House and the Secretary of
the Senate.87 Since Harriss, no federal lobbying law has gone as far as the
Missouri law deemed unconstitutional by the Eighth Circuit.88

B. The First Amendment
While lobbying is subject to extensive and complicated rules and
requirements, courts have held that the activity of lobbying is constitutionally
protected as either a right to free speech, a right to petition the government for
the redress of grievances, or a blend of the two.89 The First Amendment reads:
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
84. Harriss, 347 U.S. at 623–26.
85. Id. at 623.
86. Susman, supra note 81, at § 4:6.
87. See 2 U.S.C. § 1601; 2 U.S.C. §§ 261–270.
88. LAKEEXPO, Federal Appeals Court Decides Against Mid-Missouri Man,
Ruling
Unpaid
Activists
are
Lobbyists
(Nov.
28,
2018),
https://www.lakeexpo.com/news/politics/federal-appeals-court-decides-against-midmissouri-man-ruling-unpaid/article_1e5753f8-f351-11e8-acda-2b62698aa738.html
[https://perma.cc/6L2F-SKP2].
89. See Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 552
(1983) (Blackman, J., concurring) (“[L]obbying is protected by the First
Amendment.”); Ostas, supra note 69, at 37 (“In sum, the case law illustrates that
lobbying is indeed protected under the First Amendment.”) (“Whether one
characterizes the right to lobby as a free speech right, a right to petition the
government, or as an amalgam of the two, it is clear that lobbying and lobbyists enjoy
First Amendment protections.”); United States v. Fin. Comm. to Re-Elect the
President, 507 F.2d 1194, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (“Lobbying is of course a pejorative
term, but another name for it is petitioning for the redress of grievances. It is under the
express protection of the First Amendment.”); Andrew P. Thomas, Easing the
Pressure on Pressure Groups: Toward a Constitutional Right to Lobby, 16 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 149 (1993) (arguing that there is, or at least that there should be, a right
to lobby under the First Amendment); cf. also, United Mine Workers of America,
District 12 v. Illinois State Bar Association et al., 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1969) (“[The]
rights to assemble peaceably and to petition for a redress of grievances are among the
most precious of the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights. These rights,
moreover, are intimately connected, both in origin and in purpose, with the other First
Amendment rights of free speech and free press.”).
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the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.”90 As relevant here, the First
Amendment guarantees individuals the freedom to share their policy ideas
with elected officials without punishment or reprisal.91 The government may
not suppress an individual’s right to political speech, but it can regulate it
through disclaimer and disclosure requirements.92 Typically, laws that
regulate political speech are subject to the highest level of scrutiny – strict
scrutiny.93 However, if the law is a disclosure law – as in this case – it is
subject to exacting scrutiny.94
In McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, the Supreme Court found
that the First Amendment protects an individual’s right to remain
anonymous.95 Margaret McIntyre distributed pamphlets to people attending
a public meeting where the school superintendent planned to discuss an
upcoming referendum on a proposed school tax levy.96 She also placed some
of the pamphlets on car windshields in the school parking lot.97 The
pamphlets included McIntyre’s opinion on and opposition to the new tax;
some pamphlets included her name but others did not.98 The Ohio Elections
Commission fined McIntyre for violating an Ohio statute, which prohibited
the distribution of campaign literature that does not include the name and
address of the person or campaign official distributing the literature.99
However, the Supreme Court deemed the statute unconstitutional as it violated
McIntyre’s First Amendment right to remain anonymous.
While the right to remain nameless is “an aspect of the freedom of speech
protected by the First Amendment,” the Supreme Court of the United States
found that a Washington law allowing the public disclosure of referendum
petition signatures did not violate the First Amendment.100 In Doe No. 1 v.
Reed, the plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the State of
Washington from making referendum petitions available under the state’s
Public Records Act.101 Plaintiffs did not want the names and contact
information of individuals who signed the petitions released publicly.102 They
argued that the Act violated the First Amendment.103 The Supreme Court

90. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
91. Id.
92. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 319 (2010).
93. Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, 692 F.3d 864, 874–75
(8th Cir. 2012).
94. Id.
95. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995).
96. Id. at 337.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 338.
100. Summers, 942 F.3d at 425.
101. Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 193 (2010).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 194.
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found that the law was “subject to review under the First Amendment” but
that it was subject to review using exacting scrutiny rather than strict
scrutiny.104 The Court concluded that the state can impose disclosure
requirements in an electoral context if the requirements are substantially
related to an important government interest.105

IV. INSTANT DECISION
Judge Stras wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Judge Smith and
Judges Gruender, Erickson, Grasz, and Kobes.106 The court held: (1)
Missouri’s lobbying restrictions could be upheld from First Amendment
challenge so long as they survived “exacting scrutiny”; (2) Missouri’s
lobbying restrictions violated the First Amendment right of an unpaid
lobbyist, who neither spent nor received any money in connection with his
advocacy; but (3) Missouri’s lobbying law that applied to anyone “designated
to act as a lobbyist by any […] nonprofit corporation, association[,] or other
entity” was not unconstitutionally vague and invalid on its face.107 Judge
Grasz wrote a concurring opinion, arguing only that the majority used the
wrong level of scrutiny.108 Judge Colloton wrote a dissenting opinion, joined
by Judges Loken and Benton, arguing that the court should not have reheard
the case en banc because of its procedural irregularities.109 Judge Shepherd
also wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Judges Colloton and Kelly, arguing
that the State of Missouri and its citizens deserve to know who is attempting
to influence their elected officials and how, regardless of whether money
changes hands.110

A. The Majority Opinion
Regarding Calzone’s as-applied challenge, the Eighth Circuit concluded
that the application of the law to Calzone did violate the First Amendment.111
Judge Stras dismissed the procedural issues that Judge Shepherd outlined in
the earlier opinion and concluded that Calzone had not forfeited his claims
just because he did not emphasize his no-expenditure issue earlier in the
case.112 Rather, Judge Stras noted that Calzone “consistently emphasized”
and raised the issue “at numerous steps in the litigation.”113 Further, Judge
Stras noted that since the State did not raise forfeiture when it realized there
104. Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 194-196 (2010).
105. Id. at 199.
106. Calzone v. Summers, 942 F.3d 415, 418 (8th Cir. 2019).
107. Id. at 423–26.
108. Id. at 426.
109. Id. at 428 (Colloton, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 439 (Shepherd, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 425 (majority opinion).
112. HARVARD LAW REVIEW, supra note 1.
113. Summers, 942 F.3d at 420.
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was a threshold disagreement between members of the Eighth Circuit panel,
it actually forfeited its forfeiture argument.114 Judge Stras concluded that the
undisputed fact that “Calzone spends no money nor gives anything of value
to anyone when pursuing his advocacy activities” was a detail that the court
had to consider when evaluating his First Amendment challenge.115
Therefore, the question before them was “[C]an Missouri require Calzone to
pay a fee and publicly disclose his political activities, even though he neither
spends nor receives any money in connection with his advocacy?”116 The
Eighth Circuit concluded the answer was no.117
Both sides agreed that Calzone engages in First Amendment activity.118
Citing the Supreme Court, the majority contended that “interactive
communication concerning political change” cuts at the heart of the First
Amendment and the right to “petition for a redress of grievances [is] among
the most precious of […] liberties.”119 Further, the majority argued that
Calzone does not lose his First Amendment rights simply because “he speaks
through an organization that shares his perspective” because both Calzone and
the organization have the right to “make their views known.”120 Even so, the
state has some power to regulate speech, and the nature of the regulation
determines how closely the court can scrutinize it.121 As mentioned above,
since Missouri’s lobbying law is a “disclosure law,” the court reviewed it
using “exacting scrutiny,” so the State had the burden to show that the law is
substantially related to a sufficiently important government interest.122
The State’s asserted governmental interest was “transparency.”123
Transparency, according to the Eighth Circuit, encompassed two ideas: (1) a
narrower interest in sharing information about advocacy activities in order to
prevent actual or apparent public corruption; and (2) a general interest in
having the world know who is trying to influence the General Assembly.124
The majority found that neither justification survived “exacting scrutiny.”125
First, Judge Stras rejected the State’s claim about its interest in preventing
corruption.126 While he agreed that the interest of transparency is “important,”
he found that applying the law to Calzone was not substantially related to that

114. Id. at 421.
115. Id. at 422.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. (citing Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 422 (1988); United Mine Workers
of Am., Dist. 12 v. Ill. State Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967)).
120. Id. at 423.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 424.
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interest.127 Citing McCutcheon v. FEC, Judge Stas concluded that the
government can only target ‘quid pro quo’ corruption and since there is no
“quid” because Calzone does not spend or receive any money nor offer
anything of value to legislators, whatever “quo” he receives must be attributed
to his speech alone, not corruption.128 Further, while “casting a wide net might
make it easier for Missouri to catch legislative lobbyists involved in actual
corruption[,]” there are other existing provisions that would serve the same
purpose.129 Second, Judge Stras concluded that the State’s broader
transparency interest of having the world know who is trying to influence the
General Assembly – “legislators needing to know who is speaking to
determine how much weight to give the speech” and the public needing “to
know who is speaking so it can hold legislators accountable for their votes” –
was not sufficiently important to justify limiting Calzone’s speech.130 Judge
Stras emphasized the idea that when money does not change hands, there is a
“respected tradition of anonymity in the advocacy of political causes.”131 So,
in this case, Calzone has a right to remain nameless to the state.132
The majority found that since Calzone does not spend or receive any
money in connection with his activities, the burden of the lobbyist
requirements on his First Amendment rights outweighed Missouri’s interest
in transparency.133 Therefore, the application of the law to Calzone violated
his First Amendment rights.134 However, regarding Calzone’s facial
challenge, like the courts before it, the full Eighth Circuit found that
“designated” was clearly defined and the statute was clear enough that “a
person of ordinary intelligence” could reasonably understand it.135
Accordingly, the court vacated the judgement against Calzone and remanded
for further consideration of Calzone’s request for permanent injunction.136

B. The Concurring Opinion
Judge Grasz otherwise agreed with the majority except for the standard
of scrutiny used.137 He argued that “[l]aws that burden political speech are
subject to strict scrutiny” and since petitioning one’s government is political
speech, lobbyist requirements should actually be subject to the higher
127. Id.
128. Id. (citing McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 206–07 (2014)).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 424–25.
131. Id. at 425.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 426.
136. Id. On remand, the lower court denied Calzone’s request for permanent
injunction concluding that the request was moot. Calzone v. Summers, No. 2:16-CV04278-NKL, 2020 WL 1170225, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 11, 2020).
137. Summers, 942 F.3d at 426 (Grasz, J., concurring).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository,

15

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 1 [], Art. 8

312

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

standard.138 He contended that the majority disregarded circuit precedent and
read Citizens United too broadly when it applied exacting scrutiny.139

C. The Dissenting Opinions
In his dissent, Judge Colloton argued that the court should not have
reheard the case en banc because of the procedural irregularities that
prevented the development of the constitutional question in the district
court.140 He noted that an en banc rehearing in a court of appeals should be
reserved only for “questions of exceptional importance” first considered by a
district court and then a three-judge panel.141 In this case, however, the en
banc majority functioned as a court of first review and reversed a judgement
on an issue that was never actually addressed at earlier stages of the
litigation.142
Likewise, in his dissent, Judge Shepherd outlined all the instances,
before the district court and the Eighth Circuit panel, where Calzone raised
the issue of whether the law could constitutionally apply to him as an
uncompensated individual.143 But he emphasized that Calzone never included
his lack of expenditures as part of that claim.144 Just as he did in his Eighth
Circuit panel majority opinion, Judge Shepherd argued that since Calzone did
not raise the issue of unpaid lobbyists “who make no expenditures” until oral
arguments, he forfeited the claim and waived the argument.145

V. COMMENT
The court’s holding is troubling for a number of reasons: it misrepresents
Calzone as a grassroots activist and ignores his extensive lobbying efforts; it
suggests that Missourians have no interest in knowing who is influencing their
government, regardless of whether they receive compensation; it ignores the
reality of targeted pressure campaigns; and it largely misrepresents Calzone’s
intentions of bringing this lawsuit. This Part outlines each of these concerns
in turn.
First, the majority largely misrepresents Calzone as “a modern-day folk
hero who wants nothing more than to be free to petition his government.”146
In reality, Calzone is exactly the type of individual that the law considers a

138. Id. at 426–27 (citing Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)).
139. Id. at 426–27.
140. Id. at 428 (Colloton, J., dissenting).
141. Id.
142. Id. The majority never addressed the allegation that it was improper for the
court to rehear the case en banc. Id. at 418–26 (majority opinion).
143. Id. at 432–34 (Shepherd, J., dissenting).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 430.
146. Id.
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lobbyist.147 The majority even acknowledges that Calzone is not the average
citizen, noting that he is “an active figure in Missouri politics.”148 However,
in its opinion, the majority ignores Calzone’s “extensive lobbying efforts.”149
Calzone is the “incorporator, sole officer, president, director, and registered
agent”150 of Missouri First whose charter states: “[…] legislative lobbying
[…] may be used to teach and to influence public policy […] Missouri First
will campaign for legislative and ballot initiatives, but will not lobby or
campaign for a particular political party.”151 The Missouri First website
recruits new members by emphasizing that “‘there is strength in numbers’ […]
especially when lobbying Missouri House and Senate members.”152 Calzone
typically meets with legislators, legislative staff, and legislative groups to
advocate for the passage or blocking of legislation.153 He identifies himself
not just as Ronald Calzone, but “Ronald Calzone, Director of Missouri First”
and testifies that he is appearing or speaking “on behalf of Missouri First.”154
Calzone even admits himself that he lobbies.155 In a tweet following the
decision, a Missouri political reporter noted, “Love him or hate him, he’s a
fixture in the Missouri Capitol […]” implying not only that Calzone is wellknown by his peers in Jefferson City, but also that he has been long established
in the capitol building.156 Further, Calzone frequently brings these sorts of
lawsuits against the state, something an average citizen would not have the
time nor the resources to do.157 Calzone is not merely an individual citizen

147. Id. at 431.
148. Id. at 418, 431.
149. Id. at 430.
150. Id. at 418.
151. Id. at 431 (emphasis added). Missouri First’s charter was later amended to
read, “Missouri First will address legislative and ballot issues, as well as specific
candidates who further our stated objectives, but will not campaign for a particular
political
party”
(emphasis
added).
See
MO.
FIRST
CHARTER,
http://www.mofirst.org/docs/charter.htm [https://perma.cc/CZ3V-4Y2B] (last visited
December 11, 2020).
152. Id. at 431 (emphasis added).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Calzone v. Hagan, No. 2:16-CV-04278-NKL, 2017 WL 2772129, at *3
(W.D. Mo. June 26, 2017), vacated and remanded sub nom. Calzone v. Summers, 942
F.3d 415 (8th Cir. 2019).
156. Tony Messenger (@tonymess), TWITTER (Nov. 1, 2019, 4:41 PM),
https://twitter.com/tonymess/status/1190383494482055175 (emphasis added).
157. See Jason Taylor, Lawsuit against Missouri legislature’s Convention of
States
resolution
tossed,
MISSOURINET
(June
29,
2018),
https://www.missourinet.com/2018/06/29/lawsuit-against-missouri-legislaturesconvention-of-states-resolution-tossed/
[https://perma.cc/ZQ7E-F3JA];
NEWS
TRIBUNE, Missouri Supreme Court rules on legislative powers case (Oct. 2, 2019),
https://www.newstribune.com/news/local/story/2019/oct/02/missouri-supremecourt-rules-on-legislative-powers-case/797854/
[https://perma.cc/5SQS-2734];
FREEDOM CTR. OF MO., Missouri Rancher Files Lawsuit to Put the Brakes on
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who wants only to express his personal views.158 He is a “legislative lobbyist”
in every sense of the term.
Second, the holding wrongly suggests that Missouri does not have a
sufficiently important governmental interest in having unpaid lobbyists
register. The dissent argues, “[T]he distinction between paid and unpaid
lobbyists does not alter the equation so significantly.”159 The Supreme Court
in Harriss described the interest in having lobbyists register this way:
Present-day legislative complexities are such that individual members
of Congress cannot be expected to explore the myriad pressures to
which they are regularly subjected. Yet full realization of the
American ideal of government by elected representatives depends to
no small extent on their ability to properly evaluate such pressures.
Otherwise[,] the voice of the people may all too easily be drowned out
by the voice of special interest groups seeking favored treatment while
masquerading as proponents of the public weal.160

While the statute at issue in Harriss applied only to paid lobbyists, the interest
described here applies to unpaid lobbyists just the same.161
Further, the dissent argues that the majority’s holding suggests there is
little difference between a concerned citizen who writes a letter to their
legislator, a “self-described lobbyist like Calzone who seeks to exploit
‘strength in numbers’ to influence lobbyists,” and a “volunteer” lobbyist
affiliated with an organization like the Sierra Club or the National Rifle
Association.162 Therefore, the holding could mean that “volunteer” lobbyists
affiliated with organizations would not have to disclose their lobbying
activities.163 It gives lobbyists permission to influence legislators in secret as
long as they neither spend nor receive money in the process.164 The reality is
that lobbyists can still influence the political process without opening their
wallet, and lobbyists will use this decision to create loopholes in the
process.165 For example, an individual might recruit a candidate to run for
office, volunteer for a candidate’s campaign, organize fundraisers for the
candidate, and introduce the candidate to campaign donors and other political
Suspiciousless
Vehicle
Stops
(June
4,
2015),
http://www.mofreedom.org/2015/06/calzone-v-koster/
[https://perma.cc/DF6WCTVW].
158. Summers, 942 F.3d at 431 (Shepherd, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 437.
160. Id. at 437–38 (quoting United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954)).
161. Id. at 438.
162. Id. at 430.
163. Id. For example, if an individual is employed by the organization to fulfill a
certain job function, and they actually do fulfill it at some level, but they also
“volunteer” to lobby in their spare time, they might not be required to register as a
lobbyist in the State of Missouri. Id.
164. Stern, supra note 6.
165. Id.
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players. Once the candidate is elected, the individual already has the newly
elected official’s ear, and it is not a far reach to assume the official will want
to compensate that individual for their efforts.
On the flip side, if the State would have won, it would have “treated
every civically-engaged Boy Scout troop and Audubon Society chapter like a
group of paid lobbyists, merely for speaking with their elected
representatives.”166 In his dissent in the Eighth Circuit panel decision, Judge
Stras wrote:
By sweeping so widely, Missouri law endangers the free exchange of
ideas. Indeed, a political adversary, an unscrupulous government
official, or even a legislator tired of being held accountable could
simply submit a complaint to the Commission accusing a politically
active citizen of lobbying – that is, speaking out – without first
registering as a lobbyist.167

In fact, Calzone believes that is exactly what happened in this case.168 Stras
argued that an opposite ruling would have “endangered the free exchange of
ideas.”169 He feared that, in the alternative, every activist that joined a “lobby
day” – a day set aside where advocacy groups encourage active citizens to
meet with their representatives in the Capitol – would need to register as a
lobbyist.170 However, those activists do not walk the halls of the Missouri
State Capitol every day, they are not well-known among their colleagues in
Jefferson City, and they are not introducing themselves as the director of a
nonprofit organization whose charter explicitly states that it lobbies the
Missouri General Assembly. The majority failed to strike a balance between
these two extremes.
166. INSTITUTE FOR FREE SPEECH, supra note 3.
167. Calzone v. Summers, 909 F.3d 940, 955–56 (8th Cir. 2018) (Stras, J.,
dissenting), vacated en banc, 942 F.3d 415 (8th Cir. 2019).
168. Ron Calzone, Lobbyists, legislators aim to quash political activist’s free
LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH,
(Sept.
30,
2015),
speech,
ST.
https://www.stltoday.com/opinion/columnists/lobbyists-legislators-aim-to-quashpolitical-activist-s-free-speech/article_5053629c-ec48-57c8-b5e8e5e3b39a4bba.html [https://perma.cc/8SGV-TX9X] (“My activism has made some
powerful enemies […] One Election Day last November, the professional lobbyists’
guild, with the blessing of (and possibly at the prompting of) at least two influential
legislators, decided to try to punish me and scare away other activists for exercising
our constitutional freedoms.”); Morgan, supra note 70 (“[Calzone’s] behavior upset
some folks. Specifically, some powerful legislators who didn’t care for Ron. To punish
him for speaking his mind, they engineered an ethics complaint that accused Ron of
flouting lobbyist registration and reporting laws.”).
169. Summers, 909 F.3d at 955.
170. Morgan, supra note 70; Philip Wegmann, Missouri Lobbyists don’t want
citizens talking to legislators, US Court of Appeals agrees, WASHINGTON EXAMINER
(Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/missouri-lobbyistsdont-want-citizens-talking-to-legislators-us-court-of-appeals-agrees
[https://perma.cc/G84F-CYPB].
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Third, the holding ignores the reality of “coordinated pressure
campaigns.”171 The majority argued that an individual who advocates for his
views does not lose his First Amendment right to do so simply because he
speaks through a non-profit organization that shares his perspective.172 Both
the individual and the non-profit organization have the right to make their
views known.173 But the dissent suggested that denying application of the
statute to unpaid lobbyists like Calzone does not consider the importance of
“strength in numbers” and “coordinated pressure campaigns.”174 This
concern is related to Missouri’s broader transparency interest in helping the
world know who is trying to influence legislators, thereby enhancing
legislative accountability.175 Using his association with Missouri First,
Calzone gives legislators the impression that he speaks on behalf of a group,
not just himself.176 It does not matter if Calzone “actually speaks on behalf
of others,” it only matters if “legislators think he is speaking on behalf of
others.”177 This, according to Judge Shepherd, directly relates to the
government’s interest in promoting transparency in the face of “coordinated
pressure campaigns.”178
Some have suggested that if Calzone were not the “alter ego” of Missouri
First, then the government’s transparency issues would have been strong
enough to justify the application of the disclosure law to his activity.179 The
only thing that seems to save Calzone in this case is that he and his nonprofit
organization are one. Does that mean that the court’s criterion of not getting
paid is too blunt to catch individuals like Calzone if they are unpaid but not
alter egos of their organizations?180 If this question were to come up again,
the court could narrow their holding to lobbyists who are uncompensated,
incur no expenditures, and do not in reality speak on behalf of others.181 Such
a narrowed holding would not address Judge Colloton’s concerns about
171. HARVARD LAW REVIEW, supra note 1.
172. Calzone v. Summers, 942 F.3d 415, 423 (8th Cir. 2019).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 438 (citing Fla. Ass’n of Prof’l Lobbyists, Inc. v. Div. of Legislative
Info. Servs., 525 F.3d 1073, 1080 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that “the state has a
compelling interest in self-protection in the face of coordinated pressure campaigns
directed by lobbyists . . . [and] allow[ing] voters to appraise the integrity and
performance of officeholders and candidates, in view of the pressures they face”)); see
also McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 346–47 (1995) (“In a
republic where the people are sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to make informed
choices among candidates for office is essential, for the identities of those who are
elected will inevitably shape the course that we follow as a nation.”); HARVARD LAW
REVIEW, supra note 1.
175. Summers, 942 F.3d at 438
176. Id. at 431.
177. HARVARD LAW REVIEW, supra note 1.
178. Summers, 942 F.3d at 438.
179. HARVARD LAW REVIEW, supra note 1.
180. HARVARD LAW REVIEW, supra note 1.
181. HARVARD LAW REVIEW, supra note 1.
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perceived strength in numbers, but it would take into account a lobbyist’s
actual strength in numbers – and Calzone’s arguments would likely not pass
muster under that holding.182
Finally, the holding suggests that Calzone sought to remain anonymous
in his political activity, which he did not. The majority compares Calzone to
the plaintiff in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, who “sought to place
handbills on car windshields in a school parking lot without identifying herself
as the author of the literature.”183 However, nowhere in his appellate brief
does Calzone mention an interest in anonymity.184 In fact, he appears openly
before legislators and their staff in an effort to influence their votes, and his
name is written all over Missouri First’s website, which is accessible by the
public at large.185 The majority is confusing anonymity with a lack of
compensation, and that error will drastically impact the future of Missouri
lobbying efforts.

VI. CONCLUSION
The State of Missouri and its citizens deserve to know exactly who is
attempting to influence its laws and how.186
Missouri’s lobbying
requirements ensure transparency and imposes only a minimal burden on
lobbyists, even when they are unpaid.187 However, according to this case,
“there has to be nexus of money involved before the government gets to
regulate political activity, at least in the sense of lobbying.”188 While the state
opted not to appeal this case to the United States Supreme Court, given the
political climate of Jefferson City, Calzone v. Summers is sure not to be the
last discussion regarding lobbying requirements in Missouri.
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183. Summers, 942 F.3d at 424–25, 439 (citing McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995)).
184. Id. at 439.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Zac Morgan & Caleb O. Brown, Citizen Activism vs. Missouri Regulators,
CATO INSTITUTE (Nov. 8, 2019), https://www.cato.org/multimedia/cato-dailypodcast/citizen-activism-vs-missouri-regulators [https://perma.cc/H9FS-72GS].
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